The perception of banking environment in China by Hong Kong's commercial banks. by Ip, Sai Wing. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Business Administration.
THE PERCEPTION OF BANKING ENVIRONMENT IN 
CHINA BY HONG KONG'S COMMERCIAL BANKS 
bv 
. … ‘ IP SAI WING 
j i . 收 
^ % 
MBA PROJECT REPORT ( 
Presented to 
The Graduate School 
In Partial Fulfilment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
THREE-YEAR MBA PROGRAMME 
THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG 
‘ May 1995 
< 
fi</统系馆書nYtNi 
_ J 5 fffl 脆 _ 
^ ~ U N I V E R S I T Y " " " U (x) 
N ^ ^ B R A R Y S Y S T E M / ^ • I 
( F F / -
APPROVAL 
Name : Ip Sai-Wing 
Degree : Master of Business Administration 
Title of Project: The Perception of Banking Environment in China 
by Hong Kong's Commercial Banks 
� . fC . /C/ c o 
Professor M . ^ N y a w 
Date A p p r o v e d : � 
� < 
ABSTRACT ‘ 
This study aims at identifying the important factors which are motivating or 
demotivating the foreign banks to make investments in China. The positive factors will 
encourage foreign banks to invest or set up offices in China. The negative factors will 
have adverse impact on foreign banks' investment and hinder them from further 
development in China. 
The important positive factors rated by the respondents include political stability, 
continuation of open-door policy, the expected rapid growth of economy and market and 
the market opportunities, such as the import/export businesses, the opening of RMB 
business to foreign banks and the joining the World Trade Organization. The foreign 
banks are looking for stable environment with good market potential. The Renminbi 
business is the major attraction to the foreign banks. 
The important negative factors named by the respondents are stable instability, 
frequent changes in economic policy, the enforceability of laws and regulations and 
corruption. The results show a picture to the readers that these factors are the major 
concerns when foreign banks plan for investment in China. Moreover, some of these 
. ii 
negative factors are already encountered by foreign banks in China, for example, the 
guanxi and corruption problems, and the doubt about the enforceability of laws and 
regulations. The Chinese Government should pay attention to eliminate or minimize the 
J. 
negative effects of these threatening factors. 
The size of banking market in China is attractive. However, it is a long way to 
fully reform the China banking systems. Foreign banks should plan the investments with 
long term goal. It is commonly recognised that doing business in China is challenging. 
Comment from Montagu-Pollock may be appropriate for most foreign banks: "High Risk, 
Good (Long-Term) Returns." (Montagu-Pollock 1992, p.34) 
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INTRODUCTION 
"China: The Star of 2010". This is the headline quoted by South China Morning 
Post on April 20，1994. The report was based on World Competitiveness Report 1994 
which has drawn conclusion based on responses of 1,747 executives worldwide. This is 
an authoritative executive opinion survey where China got the largest number of votes 
from 1,747 international business leaders who were asked to choose the six most 
competitive countries by 2010. The People's Republic of China ( "PRC") ' received 748 
votes, compared with 673 for the U .S .A . , 578 for Japan, 392 for Germany, 312 for 
South Korea and 204 for Singapore. Out of the top six choices, four Asian countries are 
on the list, which adds weight to the belief that the next century will belong to Asia. 
Since the implementation of the open-door policy in China in 1979, foreign 
investors have been rushing to China. The total foreign capital employed from 1979 to 
‘ I n this study, PRC and China will be used interchangeably to represent the People's 
Republic of China. 
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1993 was amounted to USD61.8 billion.(The China Foreign Economics and Trade 
Annual Report 1994/95. p.47) Foreign investment has become one of the most important 
contributors to China's economic development. 
Foreign banks have played a significant role to fund the foreign investments. 
Although China has lured foreign capital since 1979，foreign banks could not get their 
first step in China until the promulgation of the Administration of Special Economic Zone 
Wholly Owned Foreign Banks and Equity Joint Venture Banks Regulations ( "SEZ 
Regulations") in 1985. Before that, foreign banks could only set up representative offices 
in China, and these offices were not allowed to take any loan business. After the SEZ 
Regulations, the number of foreign bank branches increased rapidly and there were 
already one hundred and fifteen foreign banks that have set up branches or representative 
offices in China.(M()ntagu-Pollock 1994, p.41) By the year ended 1994, the total assets 
and total deposits of foreign banks in China were USD11.8 billion and 2.49 billion 
respectively.(Ming Pao, April 10，1995) Most of the foreign bank branches became 
profitable after two years' operation. 
However, the situation is not so straight-forward. When the same group of 
business leaders in the captioned survey were asked to name the country with the best 
government to support their competitiveness, they picked the U .S .A . (697 votes), Japan 
(693 votes) and Singapore (513 votesUSouth China Morning Post April 20，1994) 
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Germany, Switzerland, and South Korea came in next while China failed to make the 
grade in this category. Though the foreign investors are eager to grasp the great 
development potential in China, they are doing business with certain extent of 
reservations. These reservations include the political stability, continuation of the open-
door policy, reinforceability of the laws and regulations, etc. The return of investment 
in China is high but it is generally agreed by businessmen that doing business in China 
is relatively risky. Recently, Lehman Brothers has launched two lawsuits against two 
prime PRC corporations, namely, Unipec and Minmetals. These disputes have alerted 
the foreign banks that lending to China is not risk-free. With reference to the non-
performing obligations of the Chinese parties, a credit rating agency, Standard & Poor's 
warned the Chinese authorities that it was concerned about a pattern of repeated 
behaviours in which mainland state-owned enterprises or branches of government 
allegedly broke contracts. 
We have seen a number of researches studying the banking industry in China. It 
is of particular interest to investigate how foreign banks with offices in China view the 
China banking environment so that future development strategy can be recommended for 
those who are planning to enter the China market. 
t. 
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Specifically, the purpose of the present study is to investigate: 
i 
1. the factors identified by the foreign banks that will motivate or demotivate their 
investment decisions in China; 
2. whether there is any difference of these factors identified by different groups of 
foreign banks, classified as PRC banks, Hong Kong-based local banks and 
overseas banks. 
The classification of these banks will be discussed in details in the Methodology 
chapter. 
CHAPTER II 
L ITERATURE REVIEW 
Because of the significant influencing power to the international financial market, 
there were numerous studies on the financial system in China. Scholars were interested 
to find out how the finance sector worked within the largest centrally planned economy 
in the world. 
One of the earliest studies could be traced back to the work of Byrd (1983)，who 
had shed lights on the changing role of banks in China's financial system in the year 
1983. When China opened its door to the West, information and data available were 
very limited in early years. Even data were available, "there are still problems in 
understanding the data, its scope, and precise definitions, as well as in analyzing 
institutional interactions and decision-making processes." (Byrd 1983, p. 1-2) The same 
problems are still faced by scholars nowadays. 
In the early stage of China's open-door policy, there were two distinct 
administrative jurisdictions overlooking the financial system, namely the People's Bank 
c 
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of China ( "PBGC") and Ministry of Finance ("MOF") . PBGC was China's chief banking 
institution, an independent, ministry-level entity that reported directly to the State 
Council, which was the highest executive body in the PRC Government ("the 
Government"). Representing the Government, PBOC was supervising mainly four . 
financial units. They were the People's Insurance Company of China, Bank of China 
("BOC"), the State Administration of Exchange Control ( " SAEC" ) and the Agricultural 
Bank of China ( "ABC") . On the fiscal side the MOF played a very important role. It 
managed the People's Construction Bank of China ("PCBC")，which handled state budget 
capital construction appropriation. 
In the 1960s, PBOC functioned in two ways. It was an administrative organ for 
government financial management and at the same time it was an economic entity 
managing loan activities. It served many of the functions that in market economies were 
the responsibilities of central bank, as well as performed services elsewhere handled by 
commercial banks. Other financial units, such as BOC, ABC and PCBC, were acting as 
cashiers of PBOC and MOF. Banking reforms were implemented in 1978 to strengthen 
the financial system. The reforms reasserted the independence of the banking system so 
that their roles and functions were more clearly separated from those of the fiscal system. 
The other major feature was the institutional proliferation. The number of financial 
institutions increased significantly. The above were ideal system according to design but 
the progress for the reforms was slow. 
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The role of central bank in China's economic reforms was further studied by Holz 
(1992). Although banking reforms started in 1978, the role of PBOC was still vague. 
On September 17, 1983, the State Council passed the resolution to convert PBOC into 
a solely central bank. In the same year, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
("ICBC") was established to take over the former commercial section of PBOC and 
thereafter, PBOC was not supposed to extend any commercial loans. In October 1984 
former Premier Zhao Ziyang created a "work group" to study the reform of the banking 
system. The proposal put forward by the work group include establishment of centralized 
banking administrative system, establishment of a banking system with central bank as 
the head, and development of different types of credit and circulation channels. The next 
milestone for banking reforms was the "Provisional Regulations on the Administration 
of Banks in the PRC" passed by the State Council on January 7, 1986. These were the 
first comprehensive and systematic banking regulations to provisionally regulate the 
position and objectives of the central bank, the specialized banks and the other financial 
institutions; and the administration of money, credit, savings and interest rates. 
Since then the banking system in China was characterized by a core of four 
traditional specialized banks headed by PBOC. There existed also a large number of 
other banks and financial institutions. The four specialized banks were BOC, ICBC, 
PCBC and ABC. Other important financial institutions included the Bank of 
Communications, the China International Trust and Investment Corporation ("CITIC") , 
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rural and urban credit co-operatives and post offices. 
i. 
With the progress of the reforms mentioned, there were still many restrictions on 
the commercial banks and the enterprises. Huang (1994) has cited several examples: (i) 
Specialized banks had to operate within their assigned business scope. For instance, 
foreign trade and other foreign exchange related businesses could only be handled by 
BOC，the only foreign exchange bank in China. ICBC could not make loans to 
agricultural areas which was the business of ABC. There was very little, if any, 
competition among the specialized banks; (ii) Enterprises could only open the same type 
of account with one bank, and usually this bank was specified according to the business 
nature of the enterprises. Multiple account holdings were prohibited; and (iii) Banks 
should follow the priorities and criteria set by the Government and PBOC in making 
loans. The autonomy of the specialized banks were very small. 
Lawrence C. Wolken had done a comprehensive review of the China banking 
system reform in 1990. He has presented a thorough analysis of the restructuring of 
China banking system between 1979-1989. His study not only covered the development 
and restructuring of China banking system, but also described the importance of foreign 
banks in China's economic reforms. From 1800s until Liberation in China in 1949, 
foreign banks played an active role in China financial market. Their primary function 
was supporting foreign trade with short term loans for both foreign and Chinese 
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merchants. Many foreign banks left China during the Cultural Revolution or shortly after 
Liberation because it was no longer profitable to remain in China. One of the major 
problems faced by foreign banks was the anti-Western feelings which surfaced in China 
under the new Communist Government. Despite of the difficult situation, four foreign 
banks continued their operations through their branches in Shanghai. They were the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Standard Chartered Bank, the 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation and the Bank of East Asia. The persistence of 
operations of these four banks in China while other foreign banks left has enhanced their 
relationships with the Government. They became the first batch of foreign banks allowed 
to set up branches in Shenzhen. 
Starting in 1979，the financial demands for new funds originated from the 
economic reforms have forced China to become more active in the capital market. In 
1979-80，the Government borrowed more than RMB20 billion. These loans appeared 
very attractive to many foreign banks. On February 1，1983，the PBOC issued a 
document named "Provisional Regulations for the Establishment of Representative Offices 
in China by Overseas Chinese and Foreign Financial Institutions" ("Provisional 
Regulations") which enabled the foreign banks to re-enter the China market. Foreign 
banks reacted positively to the Provisional Regulations and in 1985, 148 representative 
offices and 22 branches of foreign banks have been set up in China. 
t. 
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The development oF foreign banks in China was studied by Matthew Montagu-
Pollock in 1994. Foreign banks in China suiTered fundamental restrictions. They were 
forbidden irom taking deposits and lending in Renminbi ( "RMB") while foreign currency 
loans to local enterprises required approval from SAEC. Nevertheless, foreign banks 
were still queuing up to set up offices in China. In August 1994，one hundred and fifteen 
foreign banks, including most of the major international banks, have set up branches and 
representative offices in China. The starting business for most of the foreign banks were 
trade finance, which was to provide financing to the foreign or local enterprises for 
import or export activities. Mr. Rolf Berwerger, chief representative of Swiss Bank 
commented that "the trade flows are enormous, and a lot of banks can be fed." 
(Montagu-Pollock 1994, p.34) Local or foreign-owned enterprises in China preferred 
foreign banks U) handle their trade businesses because foreign banks processed paper 
works in a "fraction of the time it took China's specialized banks to do so". Mr. 
Montagu-Pollock also disclosed that the restricted RMB business was relaxed on a few 
occasions since 1988 by PBGC to foreign banks on experimental basis. One of these 
foreign banks was Xiamen International Bank, a sino-foreign joint venture bank in 
Xiamen, Fujian Province. Although the number of cases were still limited, it indicated 
the officials of PBGC were making some moves. He concluded that despite the problems 
and risks in China, the opportunities for foreign banks were great. There might be short 
term hiccups, but China's funding needs were enormous. 
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The researchers mentioned above have studied the evolution of the China banking 
systems, its banking reforms and the development of foreign banks in China. The 
Chinese Government is making progress for the banking reforms but the moves are very 
slow and careful. Although foreign banks commonly recognise that doing business in 
China is risky, they are keen to deal with China business. It will be useful to find out 
why they are taking active role in the China economy and what factors will discourage 
them from further development. 
CHAPTER 丨 11 
A REVIEW ON THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN CHINA 
China's first national bank was set up in 1905 with the name of Hubu Bank (Bank 
of Department of Citizens) under the Qing Dynasty. Its name was changed to Daqing 
Bank (Bank of Great Qing) in 1908 to emphasize the role of nation's central bank. It was 
again renamed Bank of China ("BOC") after the 1911 revolution, and retained the name 
ever since. BOC acted as the central bank for the Republic of China until 1928. After 
the Liberation, BOC was changed to a specialized foreign exchange bank in 1953 
(Wolken 1990，p.53-54). The following described the evolving roles of the central bank, 
specialized banks and the financial institutions. The administrative structure of China's 
banking system is given in Appendix I. 
As mentioned in the literature review, China's banking system is headed by PBGC 
which reports directly to the State Council. Under PBGC's supervision, there are four 
specialized banks, regional banks, and other financial institutions. PBGC and the four 
specialized banks form the major framework of the banking system. The background and 
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the functions of the five banks aie introduced below. 
4 
People's Bank of China 
PCBC was established on December 1, 1948，11 months before the PRC came 
into existence (Wolken 1990，p.54). During the 1950s and 1960s, it was a ministry-level 
institution reporting directly to the highest government executive organ - first the General 
Administrative Council, then after 1954 the State Council. PBGC acted as the center of 
cash, credit, and settlements. It was respsonsible for issuing all currency, and, under the 
centrally planned economy, all government entities and state enterprises had to deposit 
almost all of their cash with PBGC. All loans to state units had to come from PBGC and 
all transactions between units in the state sector were conducted by PBGC. The 
Government implemented its budgets by allocating the money held by PBGC to the 
deposit accounts of each unit. Thus, the central bank acted as fund supplier. The 
monetary policy of PBGC had little impact on the allocation of resources in China. 
The most important change of PBGC was found in January 1984. It became a 
central bank in the Western sense under the banking reforms initiated by Zhao Ziyang 
(Holz 1992, P .8). The ICBC was created to take over the commercial banking functions 
of PBGC. The introduction of ICBC allowed PBGC to concentrate on macro-economic 
policy making rather than day-to-day operations. 
4 
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The main functions of PBOC fall into three categories. First, as China's central 
bank, it formulates the nation's monetary policy and supervise its implementation; 
controls the issuance and circulation of currency; determines interest rates; assists in 
setting foreign exchange rates; and formulates and ratifies the individual plans for credit 
rationing for each of the specialized banks under its control. Second, as a regulatory 
agency, it approves the establishment, dissolution, and merging of specialized banks and 
other financial organizations; supervises and audits all financial institutions; regulates the 
issuance of negotiable securities by enterprises and supervises money markets, and drafts 
financial laws and regulations. Third, as the Government's banker, PBOC is in charge 
of the state treasury and issues Government bonds; handles official foreign exchange 
reserves; and represents the Government in relevant international financial activities 
(Wolken 1990, p.55-58). 
In general, there are two features which characterize the current status of PBOC. 
The first one is PBOC has little independence. Officially, it ranks as a ministry 
subordinated to the State Council and acts on behalf of the State Council to execute 
money control and administration. It must obey orders from the State Council and 
coordinate its actions with the State Planning Commission ( "SPC") and MOF. The 
second feature is that the central bank has very few effective monetary instruments, and 
the introduction of new instruments has been greatly restricted in the centrally planned 
economy (Huang 1994，p.48-50). 
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The Four Specialized Banks 
China's banking system is mainly supported by the four specialized banks, namely 
BOC, IGBC, PCBC and ABC. These four banks carry out the responsibilities assigned 
by PBOC. They become the outlets for deposit taking and loan disbursement. Before 
introducing the four specialized banks, the financial highlights of the four banks are 
displayed in the following table for comparison: 
Table 1: Financial Highlights of Four Specialized Banks 
for Year Ended 1993. (Unit: USD，million) 
Banks Assets Net Profit Net Worth 
ICBC 225,179 945 10,112 
BOC 198,996 1,131 7,980 
PCBC 122,491 294 3,931 
ABC 121,440 315 3,642 
Source: Annual reports of the lour banks. 
Bank of China 
BOC was founded in 1908, making it the oldest Chinese banking institution still 
functioning. It has been responsible for managing the foreign exchange and international 
payments of China. In 1993，it had over 6,200 branches, with toial staff of over 115,000 
within China. BOC also had 474 foreign branches in 12 countries including Hong Kong, 
Macau, Singapore, United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Japan, France and the U .S .A . Its 
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total assets grew from RMB137.9 billion in 1983 to RMB1,731 billion in 1993 (Bank of 
China Annual Report 1993). 
The major functions of the BOC include settling trade and other foreign exchange 
accounts between local and foreign enterprises and banks; allocating foreign exchange; 
extending credit to enterprises involved in foreign trade; accepting domestic and foreign 
currency deposits; issuing bonds in international capital markets; participating in joint 
venture investments abroad; and maintaining and managing accounts for overseas Chinese 
(Wolken 1990，p.59). 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
ICBC was established on January 1，1984 with the purpose to take over the 
commercial business of PBOC. Although the history of ICBC was much shorter than that 
of the other three specialized banks, it was the largest and most influencing banks in 
China. 
The main functions of ICBC are to accept savings deposits from individuals and 
enterprises in urban areas; provide working capital for state, collective, and individual 
enterprises in urban areas; make loans to urban enterprises for technical capital formation; 
provide payroll management and cash management for state and large collective 
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enterprises; and supervise the Urban Credit Cooperatives (Wolken 1990, p.58). 
The Agricultural Bank of China 
The earliest form of ABC was set up in 1951. It has undergone several changes 
and the final version of ABC was founded in February 1979. Most of ABC's loans were 
for less than one year and were typically used to finance the procurement and distribution 
of crops and other agricultural products. 
Rural Credit Cooperatives ( "RCC") are directly under the supervision of ABC. 
These RCC forms the grassroots units of ABC. In the early 1950s the Government, in 
its efforts to collectivize agriculture, encouraged the creation of RCC. Any peasant 
household could become a member of an RCC by purchasing at least one share at a cost 
ranging from two to five yuan. Non-members could also make deposits and borrowed 
from an RCC but they received a lower deposit interest rates and members were given 
priority access to loans. In the mid of 1980s approximately 80% of the peasant 
households were doing business with RCC (Wolken 1990, p.59). 
The main functions of the ABC include controlling the amount of cash available 
in rural areas; accepting deposits from and making loans to rural communes and various 
types of rural enterprises; helping state departments in the purchase and distribution of 
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agricultural products and supervising the RCC (Wolken 1990，p.59). 
The People's Construction Bank of China 
PCBC was set up in on October 1，1954 to take over the functions that were 
previously controlled by Bank of Communication. In 1958 PCBC was taken over by 
MOF to handle the state's investments in capital construction (Byrd 1983，p.28-29). MOF 
carried out its function mainly through PCBC, which acted more like the fiscal agent of 
MOF than a bank. 
The main functions of the PCBC include handling allocations and loans for new 
capital and large-scale technical transformation projects; holding and regulating the 
investment funds of enterprises; and supervising construction expenditures (Wolken 1990, 
p.59). 
Summary 
The above four specialized banks played significant roles in the economic 
development of China. They became the largest banks in Asian countries and were ranked 
the first four banks among the "Top 200 Asian Banks" by The Banker in October 1994. 
ICBC was the largest bank in Asian in terms of capital and total assets, followed by 
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BOC, PCBC and ABC. Following the improvement of loan quality and management, 
three of the four specialized banks received rating of Baal from Moodys'. The credit 
- 4-
rating symbolized the acceptance of these specialized banks by the international market. 
Despite of the significant sizes of these specialized banks in Asia, they do not 
receive favourable comments from Thomson Bank Watch Asia which is a credit rating 
agency for banks. Mr. Philippe F . Delhaise of Thomson Bank Watch Asia indicated that 
the banking system in China was still in serious problem (Hong Kong Economic Journal, 
March 3, 1995). Most of the lending of the specialized banks were extended to state-
owned enterprises but half of these enterprises were on the brink of bankruptcy. The 
specialized banks have to get rid of these problem loans before going commercialized. 
The newly set up policy banks did not have enough fund to take over all these policy 
loans. The policy loans, the poor management, the frequent interference by the 
Government and the corruption together became the obstacles to the banking reforms in 
China. 
To overcome the problems mentioned above, the Government has taken various 
steps to speed up the banking reforms. Some of these important steps will be described 
in the following Chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA'S BANKING REFORMS 
Beginning in 1994, the PRC Government has taken a number of measures to speed 
up the reform of its banking system. These measures included the strengthening of the 
independence of the central bank, PBOC, transforming the state-owned specialized banks 
into commercial banks, and the setting up of the policy banks to take over the policy 
loans. The transform of PBOC has been described in previous chapters. There are other 
significant steps which are important elements in the implementation of the 1993 State 
Council, Reform of the Financial System Decision, in which the Government set forth 
its plans for overhauling the nation's financial institutions. It will be necessary to 
understand the effects of these measures to foreign banks. Two major measures will be 
discussed in the following sections. They are the new regulations adopted in April 1994 
for foreign banks and the establishment of three policy banks in 1994. These steps are 
the preparatory works for the opening of the banking industry. 
K 
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Brief Commentary on New Regulations for Foreign Banks 
The People's Republic of China, Administration of Foreign Investment Financial 
Institutions Regulations ( "F IF l Regulations") were promulgated by the State Council of 
the People's Republic of China on February 25, 1994, and became effective on April 1， 
1994. Several points were noted by Finder (1995) for the new regulations. 
The FIFI Regulations superseded both the PRC, Administration of SEZ Wholly 
Owned Foreign Banks and Equity Joint Venture Banks Regulations promulgated by the 
State Council on April 2, 1985 ( "SEZ Regulations") and the Shanghai Municipality, 
Administration of Foreign-Owned Financial Institutions and Sino-Foreign Equity Joint 
Venture Financial Institutions Procedures approved by the State Council on September 
7, 1990 and promulgated by PBOC on September 8，1990 ("Shanghai Procedures"). 
The F IF I Regulations are similar in format and substance to the Shanghai 
Procedures, with certain significant differences. The FIFI Regulations are the first 
national banking regulations in the PRC, while the SEZ Regulations and Shanghai 
Procedures apply to regional areas. All foreign investment financial institutions ( "F IF I s " ) 
in the PRC, including PRC branches of foreign banks, foreign-funded and sino-foreign 
joint venture banks and finance companies, are covered by the F IF I Regulations. 
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The FIFI Regulations contain seven chapters with a total of fifty-one articles. They 
describe the requirements for establishment and registration of FIFIs in the PRC, the 
scope of business, the supervision and administration, dissolution and liquidation, and 
penalties for violations of the FIFI Regulations. The following is the highlight of the 
major differences between the FIFI Regulations and the Shanghai Procedures: 
Establishment and Registration 
a) Period of Existence in the PRC 
Previously the Shanghai Procedures required FIFIs to have a representative 
office in the PRC for at least three years before it could be upgraded to a 
branch. The FIFI Regulations have reduced the period to two years. 
(Article 7) 
b) Registered Capital 
The local currency, RMB, is used in the FIFI Regulations instead of the 
USD used in the Shanghai Procedures. The minimum registered capital 
requirement for FIFIs is now stated as RMB300 million, a slight increase 
over the USD30 million stipulated in the Shanghai Procedures. (Article 5) 
Stated in the same Article, the minimum operating funds of a branch have 
been restated from USDIO million to RMBIOO million. (For reference, 
the exchange rate of RMB to USD is approximately USD1=RMB8.7 in 
March 1995.) 
23 
c) Retained Earnings Reserve 
In the past, FIFIs were required to retain 25% of the after-tax net profit 
until the total amount of paid-up capital and reserve funds equalled twice 
the amount of the registered capital. In the FIFI Regulations this 
requirement is relaxed and the sum of the paid-up capital plus the reserve 
funds need only equal to registered capital. (Article 32) 
Scope of Business 
a) RMB Business 
The key new provisions of the FIFI Regulations are Article 17(13) and 
18(9)，which state that FIFI may, depending on the scope of business 
approved by the PBOC, engage in "approved domestic currency business". 
This is understood to mean RMB business. Although FIFIs keep 
complaining the PBOC has not followed these provisions to release the 
RMB business, we have confirmed from the Head of Fujian Branch, 
PBOC, that limited RMB business has been allowed to selected FIFIs on 
experimental basis. 
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b) Import-Export Settlement 
The import-export settlement services provided by the FIFIs to. domestic 
enterprises are restricted by the Shanghai Procedures only to transactions 
in which the funds required for import were sourced by a loan from the 
FIFIs. Under Article 21 of the FIFI Regulations, FIFIs may now 
additionally perform "approved export settlements" for domestic 
enterprises. 
Supervision and Administration • 
a) Interest Rate and Fee Standards 
The Shanghai Procedures requested the interest rate and fee standards were 
to be approved by the PBOC. The FIFI Regulations allow the FIFIs to 
freely determine the pricing in accordance with "relevant regulations of the 
PBOC", which is understood to take the form of regularly published 
interest rate and fee schedules. 
Apparently, the most significant impact is the potential opening of the RMB 
business to FIFIs. The FIFI Regulations have also set up a national regulatory 
framework for FIFIs. 
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The Policy Banks in the Banking Reforms 
Another core measure of the banking reforms is the separation of policy lending 
from the specialized banks. In the past, the four specialized banks were under the 
leadership of PBOC which gave instructions to these banks to make loans to state-owned 
enterprises regardless of the recoverability of the loans. It was estimated by Thomson 
Bank Watch Asia that 80% of the state-owned enterprises' borrowings came from the 
specialized banks and over half of these enterprises would go bankruptcy according to the 
international accounting standardsfHong Kong Economic Journal. March 29,1995). Thus, 
the setting up of these policy banks are critical to the success of the banking reforms. 
To facilitate the separation of the policy loans from the specialized banks, the 
three new non-profit policy banks were set up in 1994. They are the State Development 
Bank, the Export and Import Bank of China and the Agricultural Development Bank. 
Their major business scope are described as follows: 
The State Development Bank ("SDB") 
SDB has a registered capital of RMB50 billion (USDS.7-billion) and has been 
promised a further RMB50 billion from the Government over the next five years. The 
bank will also raise funds through the issuance of bonds in the domestic and international 
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financial markets. The SDB's head office is in Beijing and no branches are planned for 
other cities, as local operations will be handled by the branches of the PCBC. 
SDB was set up to take over the policy lending of the PCBC and the roles of six 
former investment corporations under the SPC. Its major responsibility is to finance key 
state construction projects. Priority will be given to the key state infrastructural and 
industrial projects that will either alleviate the bottlenecks in the economy or increase the 
overall economic competitiveness of China; technology upgrading and high-tech 
development projects. 
Because of its non-profit making nature, the Government will provide interest 
subsidies to the SDB to cover the difference between the higher cost of fund raising from 
bond issuance and the lower interest income from loans. It will not take deposits from 
the public. 
The Export and Import Bank of China("Eximbank") 
The Eximbank was established in July 1994 with registered capital of RMB3.4 
billion provided by the Government. It may raise fund through issuance of financial 
bonds on both domestic and international markets, and borrowing from domestic and 
overseas financial institutions. 
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The purpose of the Eximbank is to assist the Chinese trade corporations in 
accordance with the state's industrial and foreign trade policies. The major scope of 
business includes the provision of import and export credits, import and export insurance, 
project financing and credit guarantee. 
The Agricultural Development Bank ("ADB") 
ADB was the last policy bank set up in November 1994 with capital of RMB20 
billion. It will assume the responsibility for the policy lending of ABC. Previous policy 
loans in relation to agriculture that were undertaken by the ABC, PBOC, ICBC and 
PCBC would be taken up by the ADB. The head office of ADB is in Beijing and it may 
establish branches in the major provinces and may be allowed to take deposits from the 
public. 
Outlook for The Policy Banks 
The establishment of these policy banks is a new experiment in China's banking 
reforms. The policy banks will certainly facilitate the commercialization of the 
specialized banks. However, the effects from these changes should not be ignored. 
The first issue was the policy lending. Although the Government clearly stated 
the policy lending should be separated from the specialized banks, from time to time the 
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specialized banks are called upon by PBGC to support the state policies by granting loans 
to state-owned enterprises. The absolute separation of the policy lending from 
commercial banks is still a long way to go. Mr. Wang Qislian, President of PCBC 
shared the same view. He com men led, "PCBC continues to have to answer to the 
Government despite Beijing's pronouncement in early 1994 that China's four specialized 
banks should distance themselves from the Government and become pure commercial 
banks" (Chen 1995). Because the new policy banks lacked adequate funds, the 
specialized banks continued to hold a good part of China's policy loans portfolio. 
The second one was the provision of the subsidised loans through policy banks 
will officially establish a dual lending market. The co-existence of subsidised market and 
the commercial market will create distortion in the banking sector and in investment 
decisions. These subsidised loans will also contradict to the reforms in the pricing system 
and the capital market. 
While the public and the investors welcome the birth of the policy banks, the long 




In view of the increasing interests of foreign banks in the China banking market, 
this study aims at examination of the factors that have encouraged and discouraged 
foreign banks' investments in China'. The basic research method used in this study is 
literature review and field investigation. For the field investigation, both indepth 
interviews and structured questionnaires are employed. 
The literature reviews form the basic part of this study. The previous researches 
shed light on the evolution of the banking industry in China. Indepth interviews are 
conducted with experienced bankers to update the current environment in China. The 
opinions from the bankers help to formulate the questionnaire. Finally, the questionnaires 
are sent to the heads of China Department of banks in Hong Kong with branches or 
offices in China. The responses from these department heads are then analysed to 
» 
identify the important factors that affect their decision to invest in China. 
‘Foreign banks' investments in China are represented by branches or representative offices 




Three department heads of China Department of three banks, each from a PRC 
bank, a Hong Kong-based local bank and an overseas bank, were interviewed. The 
factors identified by Grub, Lin and Xia's study in 1990 ("Grub's study") were discussed 
with these experienced bankers. Some factors were deleted and new factors were added 
to reflect the updated banking environment. The results of the interviews were used to 
design the questionnaire of this study. 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed with framework similar to the one used by Grub's 
study but some of the factors were revised based on the indepth interviews. The 
questionnaire was structured lo ask the respondents to indicate their expressions toward 
the following questions: 
A. Given the different political, economic, social and cultural environment in China, 
what are the factors attracting foreign banks to invest in China? (positive factors) 
B. In your view what are the major factors adversely affecting foreign banks' 
investment decision and operations? (negative factors) 
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In question A there were seventeen positive factors identified and would be used 
to determine the major factors that had a favourable influence on foreign banks' 
investment decision in China. The respondents were asked to assign an appropriate 
degree of importance to each given positive factor. The degree varied from 1 to 4 
whereas 1 represented not important, 2 represented somewhat important, 3 represented 
important and 4 represented very important. The positive factors and their mean ratings 
are given in Chapter VI. 
In question B twenty negative factors were identified to have adverse influence on 
the foreign banks' investment decision. The respondents were asked to rate the factors 
on a scale from 1 to 4，whereas 1 represented no adverse impact, 2 represented some 
adverse impact, 3 represented considerable adverse impact and 4 represented very 
considerable adverse impact. The negative factors and their mean ratings are given in 
Chapter VI. (Copy of the questionnaire and covering letter are enclosed in Appendix II). 
Pretest of the questionnaire was conducted. Feedback from the pretests helped to 




As reported by Montagu-Pollock (1994), one hundred and fifteen foreign banks 
have established branches or representative offices in China. It was assumed that foreign 
banks with physical existence in China would understand better the banking environment 
there. The banks were divided into three groups for comparison purpose: 
1. PRC banks: banks in Hong Kong with PRC shareholdings or backgrounds, such 
as the Bank of China Group, Union Bank, etc. 
2. Hong Kong-Based local banks ("HKB local banks"): banks registered in Hong 
Kong with or without foreign shareholdings. Banks with Asian capital are also 
classified in this category because of the commonly shared cultures and values. 
3. Overseas banks: banks registered outside Hong Kong or the Asian region, with 
branches in Hong Kong. 
The list of foreign banks with physical set-up in China as reported by Montagu-
Pollock (1994) is used as our sample frame list. Questionnaires were sent to the heads 
of China Department of all the banks on the list. It was believed that the China 
Department heads were the persons in charge of business development in China and they 
were more influencing on the formulation of strategies towards China business 
development. The sample frame list is enclosed in Appendix III. 
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StalTord has deinonslrated the uses of preliminary contact to increase mail returns 
(Stafford 1966, p.410-411). After sending out the questionnaires, telephone calls were 
followed to brief the respondents the objectives of this study so that they would be 
motivated to return the questionnaires as soon as possible. If these banks were willing 
to cooperate, more questionnaires would be sent to their China offices through them. 
CHAPTER VI 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
One hundred and twenty three questionnaires were sent to the banks listed in 
Appendix II and thirty were returned. The response rate was 24.4% which was 
considered acceptable. Consistent with Stafford's results (Stafford 1966，p.410-411), 
telephone follow-up was important since the bank managers were too busy to pay 
attention to questionnaires from person they were not acquainted. 
Profile of the Respondent^; 
Of the thirty questionnaires, twelve of them were answered by heads of China 
Department while others were by managers in the same department. This is considered 
acceptable since managers in the China Department were very experienced and 
knowledgeable about the China market. The views of the heads or non-heads should be 
more or less the same. To verify this assumption, the mean ratings of each factor of the 
c 
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two groups were compared, where l-values of the dilTerences were not significant. This 
means there is no significant difference between the views of these two groups of people. 
The experience of the respondents was very important. Longer China experience 
will imply better understanding of the China market. In the sample, the mean years of 
experience of the respondents was 5.77 years with one claimed to have gained 20 years 
of experience. 
The ownership structure of the responding banks is shown in Table 2. Out of the 
thirty responses, ten are from the PRC banks while seven and thirteen are from HKB 
local banks and overseas bank respectively. In the following analysis, we shall compare 
the results of different groups to find if there is any differences among the banks with 
different ownership background. 
Table 2 : The Ownership Structure of the Responding Banks 
Ownership Number of 
respondents 
PRC owned bank 10 
Hong Kong-based local bank 7 
Overseas bank 13 
Total 30 
36 
Mean rating has been used to analyse this study. The purpose of using mean 
rating method is to provide a clear answer as to which factors motivate the foreign banks 
t 
to invest in China and which factors discourage or adversely affect the bank's investment 
decisions and operations. The answers derived from mean rating method are generally 
simple, clear and easy to understand and interpret. This method not only shows the 
reader the emerging factors but also the degree of importance or adverse impact on 
foreign banks. 
Overall Mean Ratings of the Positive Factors 
The results for the factors in question A are shown in Table 3. 
Among the positive factors, the overall mean ratings that exceed 3 would be 
identified as important to the foreign banks' investment decision. They are political 
stability, continuation of open-door policy, the opening of the RMB business to foreign 
banks, the expected rapid growth of the economy and market, joining the World Trade 
Organization in the near future and the import/export businesses of slate-owned 
enterprises. For the positive factors, the higher the mean ratings, the more important of 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Political stability is the most important factor named by all the respondents. The 
return on investment for banks are low and the payback period is long. Thus, the 
investment decisions of the foreign banks are long tei in and therefore, stable environment 
tor development will be required. When reviewing the political environment of China, 
it was basically stable in the past five years. Even after the June 4th event in 1989，the 
adverse impact on the commercial environment in China was short term and limited. The 
leaders of the Chinese Government recognised the importance of stability. In recent 
years, they even stress that stability is predominant. 
The second highest mean rating is the continuation of the open-door policy. Since 
the implementation of the open-door policy in 1979, the economy of China has been 
much improved. It is this policy that benefits both China and the foreign investors. The 
other important motivating factor is the expected rapid growth of the economy and 
market. China is a very large market with 1.1 billion population. It has experienced 
GNP growth of over 20% since 1991，one of the highest GNP growth rates in the world. 
The economic growth was so high that leads to high inflation. To slow down the 
economic growth and the inflation, the austerity programme was implemented in 1993. 
Even under the influence of the austerity measures, economic growth in 1994 was still 
21.7% (South China Morning Post. January 6, 1995). These two factors could be viewed 
as the improvement of the economic situation in China. The Chinese Government leaders 
labelled its economy as socialism with Chinese characteristics. This is in fact a mixture 
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of planned economy with the market economy, shifting its system from planned to market 
side. The impending admission to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") will push the 
change faster. The pre-requisite condition for joining WTO is to significantly open up 
the China market to foreign investors. No protection or special tariffs to be levied to 
foreign investors. Therefore, the foreign banks are holding the belief that once China 
joins the WTO, the financial market will be opened to the foreign banks. 
The other two positive factors are market related. Currently, foreign banks are 
handling some of the import and export settlements for the state-owned enterprises. The 
annual import and export of China was USD 195 billion in 1993 (The China Foreign 
Economic and Trade Annual Report 1994/95, p.35). Foreign banks are eager to get a 
larger share in this sector. In addition, the RMB deposit and lending businesses are now 
restricted to local specialized banks. Foreign banks keep pursuing the opening of this 
business area so that both RMB deposits and loans are open for competition among the 
local specialized banks and foreign banks in a free market. 
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Inter-Group Comparisons for Positive Factors 
The respondents are divided into three groups for comparison purpose. These 
groups include PRC banks (10 respondents), HKB local banks (7 respondents) and 
overseas banks (13 respondents). The choices of the factors of each group are compared 
to see whether there are any differences and explanations will be given to account for the 
differences. ‘ 
The three groups of banks agreed unanimously in four factors. They were 
political stability, continuation of open-door policy, expected rapid growth of economy 
and market, and the opening of RMB business to foreign banks. There might be slight 
differences of the mean ratings of the factors selected by the individual group, but the 
common agreements among the three groups of banks were clear. As mentioned above, 
foreign banks request stable environment for long term development. The economic 
growth should be high with good market potential. These were the major favourable 
factors to attract foreign banks to come to China. 
Although the factors chosen by the three groups of banks were somewhat uniform, 
the order of importance of these factors was different. Both the PRC banks and the 
overseas banks chose political stability and continuation of open-door policy as the most 
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important motivating factors ibr the investment decisions. For HKB local banks, the 
opening of RMB business was the most important factor. It could be explained by the 
close tie of the HKB local banks with PRC Government. For example, the Bank of East 
Asia was maintaining excellent relationships with the Government and it might be 
considered as the market leader in the China market. Its significant involvement in China 
business showed their confidence in both the political stability and the open-door policy. 
Hence, the major concern of Bank of East Asia would be the enormous market potential 
of the RMB business. 
Another exceptions among the groups was the relative operating cost in China. 
The HKB local banks chose this as the second most important factor, while the other two 
groups placed much less emphasis on this factor. The size of operation of HKB local 
banks would be smaller than those of the PRC banks and the overseas banks. The 
reduction of operating cost in China would contribute more significantly to their profit 
and loss accounts than their other two counterparts. 
Except the HKB local banks, three factors were chosen by the PRC banks and the 
overseas banks as important. These included the new banking regulations adopted in 
1994，and two market related factors, i.e. the import/export business and joining the 
WTO. With regard to three market related factors, such as the bond market, the 
syndication market and the deposit opportunity from local people, HKB local banks 
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scored relatively lower than their competitors. However, the most outstanding choice 
related to market by HKB local banks was the opening of RMB business. Obviously, the 
4-
HKB local banks were interested in RMB business opportunity and other business aspects 
would be secondary. 
The adoption of new banking regulations was very important to foreign banks in 
China but the HKB local banks scored very low in this factor. However, when compared 
to a negative factor in Question B, HKB local banks rated the enforceability of laws and 
regulations the highest among the three banks. Thus, local banks were concerned about 
the laws and regulations in China. The exceptional low score for the positive factor, new 
banking regulations, represented their low confidence in the new regulations adopted. 
Overall Mean Ratings of Negative Factors 
The results of mean ratings of negative factors in question B are shown in Table 
4. 
Of the twenty negative factors, four were rated as having very considerable 
adverse impact on foreign banks' investment decisions. These were the enforceability of 
laws and regulations, political instability, frequent changes in economic policies and 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































impact by the factors, and the vice versa. 
Political instability was selected as the major worry, which was consistent with 
the political stability as most important motivator among the positive factors. There were 
a number of political events that affected the interests of foreign investors, such as the 
liberation of China by the Communist in 1949，the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. The foreign banks were concerned about their business but 
not politics. A typical example is found in Thailand. There were infightings among the 
leaders of Thailand Government and there are frequent turnovers of Government. 
However, the leaders recognise the importance of stability to investors and whoever in 
the leadership will ensure the on-going of the existing business activities. Thus, the 
business environment remains unaffected and investors feel safe to stay in Thailand. 
Another major adverse impact was frequent changes in economic policies. Due 
to the practice of centrally planned economy, the Chinese Government inclined to use 
executive measures instead of the economic instruments to implement the economic 
policies. For example, if the Government wanted to control inflation caused by over-
heated economy, it did not use interest rate nor monetary policy because these tools were 
not effective in a centrally planned economy. Instead, the Chinese Government instructed 
the specialized banks through PBGC, to restrict new loans to be extended to state-owned 
enterprises to control the growth of fixed assets investments. The Government restricted 
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investments in fixed assets to indirectly control inflation. 
Foreign banks were always doubtful about the enforceability of laws in China. 
Legal system in China was not independent and was under the influence of the 
Communist Party. For example, foreign banks might receive favourable ruling from the 
court for repayment of loan by a state-owned enterprise. If the enterprise was related to 
ownership with strong background, it might simply ignore the ruling and the foreign 
banks could not get back what they deserved. This phenomenon was not rare in China. 
Like many other developing countries, corruption in China was rampant. 
Corruption might be found in the form of monetary terms, gifts or favours. For 
example, when foreign banks wanted to import a Toyota car for their own use, they had 
to apply for an import licence. Through normal procedures, it usually took several 
months to issue the licence. 11' the foreign banks wanted to speed up the application, 
guanxi and favours were two major methods to be employed. 
It was also worthwhile to note the importance of the credit standing of state-owned 
enterprises and the triangular debts of these enterprises. The respondents were bankers 
and their major line of business was to lend to these enterprises. Being lenders to state-
owned enterprises, the foreign banks should be concerned about the creditability of the 
borrowers. The recent disputes between Lehman Brothers and Minmetals/Unipec, was 
4. 
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a typical example that aiTected the confidence of foreign banks. The triangular debts 
were heavy burden for the state-owned enterprises and certainly affected the liquidity of 
these enterprises to fulfill their financial obligations. The triangular debts in China was 
estimated to be RMB600 billion at the end of 1994 (Hong Kong Economic Journal. 
March 31，1995). 
Inter-Group Comparisons for Negative'Factors 
For the PRC banks, they were in fact controlled by the PRC Government through 
BOC. The respondents in this group considered political instability, frequent changes in 
economic policies and enforceability of laws and regulations as having significant adverse 
impacts on their investment decision. The mean ratings of PRC banks for corruption was 
relatively lower than those of the other two groups. A follow-up discussion with some 
of the respondents in the PRC bank group revealed that because of the PRC background, 
they would not entertain any "exceptional requests" and the people in China did not 
expect any "extra benefits" from the PRC banks. The least adverse impact factors were 
language barrier, social customs differences, the negotiation style differences and the lack 
of necessary transportation facilities. Since the PRC banks were under the PRC 
ownership and were managed by PRC representatives, the people working there were 
used to the style, customs and they did not find any communication problems. 
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For the HKB local banks, they chose enforceability of laws and regulations as 
having the most adverse impact. They were enjoying independence of legal system in 
Hong Kong and they considered that the legal protection was the most important. Like 
the PRC banks, the political instability and frequent changes in economic policies would 
discourage their 
investments. Other major concerns were corruption, endless 
negotiations, burdensome bureaucracy, non-convertibility of RMB, and credit standing 
of the state-owned enterprises. These Hong Kong based local banks faced the biggest 
problem of corruption. The Chinese management style is characterized by "guanxi" 
which would stresses exchange of favours and this breeds corruption. Under this 
circumstance, people would feel easier to request rewards for what they had done. Only 
the respondents from this group had rated endless negotiations and burdensome 
bureaucracy to have considerable adverse impact on their investment decision. This 
happened because local banks were usually of smaller size and the bargaining power was 
usually smaller. The concession and the cooperation from the Chinese Government was 
usually not that significant. To overcome this problem, some of these local banks formed 
joint ventures with Chinese parties to facilitate the business development in China. 
t. 
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The HKB local banks felt that competition, ideological differences and differences 
in social customs were not important. People in Hong Kong and China are sharing the 
same social customs. They understood the ideology in China although they might not 
accept. The competition scored by the HKB local banks was the lowest among the three 
groups. HKB local banks were usually of smaller size and they looked for a specified 
range of business. Business was carried out through referral or long established 
relationship. The direct competition with other banks would be limited. 
The choice by the overseas banks were more or less the same as those of HKB 
local banks except that factors such as endless negotiations and bureaucracy were replaced 
by the triangular debts. The overseas banks were more concerned about the credit 
standing of state-owned enterprises and the influence of triangular debts. Overseas banks 
had experienced the difficulties in Latin American debt problems and the Mexican 
� 
financial crisis. Although China was undergoing rapid development, they were very 
conservative about the repayment ability of these enterprises. 
The overseas banks put more emphasis on the last negative variable, i .e. , "lending 
to China is risky". The mean rating of overseas banks for this attribute was the highest 




The foreign banks' mean ratings of other commonly identified factors were not 
high. These included language barrier, guanxi and ideological differences. There might 
be several possible explanations to the outcomes. China had implemented the open-door 
policy since 1979 and the foreign investors had been familiar with its cultures, ways of 
doing business and the ideology. Although China is still practicing the Communist 
ideology, capitalism has become very popular in the open areas of China. Moreover, all 
the interviewees were in the China business field. They would not find language problem 
since all of them speak mandarin, including non-Chinese native foreigners. 
4. 
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Comparison with the results of Grub's Study 
J 
When comparing the results of this study with those of Grub, Lin and Xia (1990) 
("Grub's study"), the positive factors matched well. The respondents of this study were 
bankers while those in Grub's were business executives. The two groups of respondents 
were in fact from the commercial world. The results of the two studies are comparable 
because the methodology and the respondents of the researches are similar in nature. The 
order of the importance of the factors in the two studies may not be the same, but they 
are identified as imporlant in both studies. The most important factor considered by 
Grub's study is market, followed by cost of labour, investment incentives and political 
stability. For both business executives and bankers, their investment decisions will be 
influenced by the above positive factors. 
For the negative factors, because of the dispersed results in Grub's study, the 
comparison is not possible. However, some common factors are still located by the 
respondents of both studies. For instance, the bureaucracy were picked by the two 
researches as cumbersome. The cultural differences and the instability are two factors 
that discourage the foreign bankers to invest in China. The lack of infrastructure will 
also hinder the investments of foreign banks. 
, -•‘ 
CHAPTER VII ‘ 
CONCLUSIONS 
Foreign banks are definitely interested to do business with China. When 
analyzing the results, some of the factors can be identified as having significant impact 
on the decision making of foreign banks. 
Positive Factors 
Stability is stressed by all the respondents to be one of the most important factors. 
Its importance increases since people are talking about the post-Deng period and they are 
predicting what will happen when Deng passes away. However, the death of Chan Yun, 
one of the very senior leaders in PRC on April 11, 1995 has showed little impact on both 
the political and economic environment. This is the kind of political stability foreign 
banks are looking for. 
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Market opportunity is an important stimulus to the foreign banks, which are 
hoping to share a portion of the RMB business. Currently, the RMB loan business, the 
i 
property mortgage market and the deposits from local residence are not opened to the 
foreign banks. Foreign banks may take property mortgage but the mortgage laws are not 
yet in place to provide legal protection. A survey by Peregrine Investment Holdings Ltd. 
disclosed that China needed up to USD233 billion by the year 2000 to develop just three 
key infrastructure sectors, namely transportation, power generation and 
telecommunication (South China Morning Post. Business Post, May 5，1994). Attracted 
by the business opportunity originated from the 1.1 billion population, the RMB2,152 
billion deposit and the RMB195 billion trading business (Ming Pao. January 18, 1995), 
foreign banks keep rushing to China to get a foot-hold to exploit these market 
opportunities which may be available in the near future. 
f 
These findings suggest strongly that, in addition to the stability, the market 




Like the mean rating of the positive factors, the political instability and the 
frequent changes of economic policies always go together to demonstrate the importance 
of stability. 
It is commonly agreed in the banking field taking legal action in China is the last 
resort. The enforceability of laws is important but bankers rarely look to litigation for 
recovery of loan. Good credit analysis prior to lending and complete documentation are 
the most important elements for lending to China. Once a bank goes to court against a 
state-owned enterprise, it will find itself in a relatively isolated position and business 
development in China will be hindered. Therefore, this factor is important but not as 
significant as the previous ones. 
Nowadays, businessmen are are tired of the corrupted environment in China. In 
the socialist market economy, the Government bodies are also the economic entities. For 
example, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation is overlooking the 
economic entities such as the commercial banks and the foreign trade corporations. The 
combination of administrative and economic status to the government officials will give 
them the opportunities to manipulate the authority associated with their position in the 
Government. The government officials may grant an import licence to a foreign trade 
a. 
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corporation which is under his control. Upon the completion of the import activities, the 
corporation makes profit and the government officials share the profit. Whether this is 
corruption is up lo the judgment of court but there is certainly conflict of interest from 
the Hong Kong investors' point of view. 
The triangular debts and the credit standing of state-owned enterprises are threats 
to foreign banks. The triangular debts situation is so serious that foreign banks are very 
conservative and very selective to lend to the state-owned enterprises with good credit 
standing. Zhu Rongji was determined to solve this problem in 1993 but up to now there 
are little improvements. 
Although the foreign banks have not selected cultural factors as important as 
others, cultural difference may become an obstacle to foreign banks' investment in China. 
China has gone through a long period of "self-imposed isolation" (Bucknall 1989， 
p.XVII). It moved back into the world by increasing foreign trade and joining the United 
Nations on October 25, 1971. The ideologies behind the communist and capitalist worlds 
are different. It will be critical for the people from these two worlds to recognise the 
differences and understand the underlying values of each. 
I. 
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Newman furtlier illustrates tlie importance of cultural difference as follows: "In 
China if another person argues with you, you assume that the person dislikes you and try 
to block your progress. I had to learn that an American may argue with you about some 
point but still be your friend." (Newman 1992, p. 145) Another issue is the "loss of face". 
It is very impolite in China to point out publicly another person's mistakes. Such open 
criticism will be considered as insult and will break the relationship. Chinese believe the 
mistakes should be reviewed in private. If the foreign banks fail to observe the social 
customs, they may find themselves in unnecessary troubles. 
The above factors are identified by the foreign banks that have adverse impact on 
their investment decision in China. 
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Summary 
China is such an enormous market that every foreign bank is keen to get a share 
of business. Although the GDP growth will be reduced from 11.8% in 1994 to 8-10% 
in 1995，the prospect of China is still optimistic (South China Morning Post. Business 
Post, January 6，1995). In addition, the foreign trade for 1994 was USD235 billion, 
20% over the previous year. The foreign investment grew at the rate of 30% in 1994. 
Therefore, the economic prospects of China are so good that it is commonly accepted 
China will be the star for this and the next decades. 
When summing up, the foreign banks are looking for a stable environment with 
good market opportunity and an economy which is growing. China is providing the kind 
of business environment for them. However, they find troubles with the problems such 
as corruption, guanxi, bureaucracy, and the triangular debts. Government is well aware 
of these problems and the banking reforms are aimed at the improvement of the banking 
system with the ultimate goal to open up the banking sector. The transform actions of 
both the PBOC and specialized banks are one of the important steps in the reforms. The 
progress of the banking reforms is slow but significant moves are observed. For 
examples, the New China News Agency reported Beijing would allow at least five foreign 
banks to set up branches this year (South China Morning Post, April 10，1995). This is 
encouraging news to the foreign banks. It is expected that in the near future more 
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strategic measures will be introduced to further the banking reforms. Foreign banks will 
be one of the beneficiaries to the reforms. 
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Recommendations 
Based on the above study, recommendations are made to the foreign banks which 
are in the process ol. tbrmulaling strategies to expand their business in China: 
1. With reference to overcoming the cultural difference, it is worthwhile to spend 
some time to learn the cultures before going into the China market. Japanese are 
doing quite well in this aspect. Managers are sent to Beijing or Taiwan to learn 
Chinese, both written and spoken, before they are transferred to China. The 
communication between Chinese and Japanese will always be direct and effective. 
This explains why the Japanese banks have become the biggest lenders in China. 
2. To protect the banks' interest under the unsatisfactory legal environment, foreign 
banks should stick to the basics when extending credit to the state-owned 
enterprises. PBOC has announced repeatedly that lending to these enterprises 
should be used to support the development of the normal line of business. No 
speculation should be involved or entertained. In addition, loan documentation 
should be completed with no exceptions. 
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3. Foreign banks should pay attention to the importance of guanxi and they should 
maintain good relations with the local government officials. Guanxi will be an 
important element lor banking operations in China. Without these human 
relationships, the development of foreign banks will be limited. 
4. As far as cost is concerned, foreign banks should consider the opening of offices 
in the northern part of China instead of concentrating in Guangdong Province. 
Shenzhen and Guangzhou should not be the only choices for consideration. For 
instance, many banks have opened branches or representative offices in Dalian 
City in north-eastern part of China. The city is close to Korea and Japan and 
business opportunity is good. 
5. If foreign banks are interested in RMB business, they should consider to set up 
a branch in Xiamen City or Fuzhou City in Fujian Province. It has been 
confirmed by the President of PBOC, Fujian Provincial Branch, during an 
interview by the writer that foreign banks are permitted to do RMB business on 
trial basis. Fujian Province may be one of the first provinces to open the RMB 
business to foreign banks. 
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Limitations 
There are several limitations of this study: 
1 • The sample size is small. It may not be appropriate to generalize the population 
based on the thirty samples. However, the results do shed lights that some factors 
are important to the foreign banks' investment decision. 
2. There may be selected-bias since we assume that the answers from the respondents 
and non-respondents are the same. But we do not know the actual attitudes of 
non-respondents. 
3. There may be the possibility of interpretation bias. The questionnaire has been 
designed with clear and easy-to-understand wordings. However, the interpretation 
by respondents may not be correct. 
4. Due to the limited time resources of the study, most of the questionnaires were 
answered by people working in Hong Kong. It will be of interest to find if there 
is any difference in attitude between the bankers working in Hong Kong and the 
bankers working in China. . 
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A P P E N D I X II (ContM) 
The New Structure of China's Banking System 
State Council 
State Monetary 
Pol icy Committee 
People's Bank of China —i 
(Central Bank) 
Specialized Existing Policy Banks 
Banks Commercial 
—J Banks 
-BOC - CITIC Industrial Bank - ADB 
-ICBC - Bank of Communication - EIBC 
-PCBC - Fujian Industrial Bank - SDB 
- A B C - China Merchants Comm'l Bank - CIB 
‘ -Shenzhen Development Bank 
-Guangdong Development Bank 
-Shanghai Pudong Dev. Bank 
-Huaxia Bank 
-Everbright Bank 
Keys: ABC : The Agricultural Bank of China 
ADB : The Agricultural Development Bank 
BOC : Bank of China 
CIB : China Investment Bank 
EIBC: The Export and Import Bank of China 
ICBC: The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
PCBC: The People's Construction Bank of China 
SDB : The Slate Development Bank 
Source: Hong Kong Business. July 1994. 
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APPBNDiX II 
February 27, 1995 
Dear Sir/Madam, ‘ 
Study on Banking Industry in China 
I am a MBA student enrolled in the part-time MBA Programme at the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong. I am currently undertaking a MBA Project on the banking industry in 
China as partial fulfilment of requirements for my MBA Degree. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the perceived banking environment in China by 
the Hong Kong bankers. We hope to have a better understanding of the industry so that 
improvements could be made and future strategies for the Hong Kong bankers will also 
be formulated. 
You are kindly requested to assist in the study by completing the enclosed questionnaire, 
which will take you about ten minutes. I would be grateful if you could return the 
completed questionnaire to me at your earliest convenience by fax: 2530 1596 or by the 
returned envelope enclosed. It is highly appreciated that you could return it to me by 
March 15, 1995. If you feel interested in our survey, we could send a copy of the result 
to you. 
Please note that all information collected will be treated in strict confidence and no 
identity of individual company will be disclosed. Results will be presented in the form 
of summarized statistics only. 
Thank you very much for your kind assistance in advance. Should you have any 
questions regarding the above, please feel free to contact me at 2842 6214 or pager 
number 1107 35779. 
Faithfully yours, Endorsed by: 
Ip Sai Wing, Norman Prof. M.K. Nyaw 
Director of MBA Programme 
(Project Supervisor) 




A P P E N D I X II (ContM) 
OIJESTIONNAIRU 
All information furnished will be kept strictly confidential. They will, be used for 
statistical analysis only without naming participating companies. We shall send you a 
copy of our report upon request. Please express your perceived banking environment in 
China. 
Question A. 
Given the different political, economic, social and cultural environments in China, in 
your view what are the factors attracting foreign banks to invest in China? 
(Please circle the number of each factor, 1 represents not important, 2 represents 
somewhat important, 3 represents important and 4 represents very important.) 
not important very important 
1. Political stability. 1 2 3 4 
2. Continuation of open-door policy. 1 2 3 4 
3. Syndicated loan business for infrastructure and 
industrial projects. 1 2 3 4 
4. The expected rapid growth of the economy and market. 1 2 3 4 
5. Low cost of labor. 1 2 3 4 
6. Assisting state-owned enterprise to apply for listing 
in the local securities market. 1 2 3 4 
7. Special exemptions from corporate income tax to foreign 
investment for a specified period of time. 1 2 3 4 
8. Favourable tax treatment for foreign personnels, 1 2 3 4 
9. Relative low operating costs in China. 1 2 3 4 
10. Double taxation avoidance agreement. 1 2 3 4 
11. The opening of the RMB business to foreign banks. 1 2 3 4 
12. Joining the World Trade Organization in the near future. 1 2 3 4 
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13. New banking regulations adopted in April 1994. 1 2 3 4 
14. The property mortgage market in China. 1 2 3 4 
15. The bond market in China. 1 2 3 4 
16. The import/export businesses of state-owned enterprises. 1 2 3 4 
17. The deposit opportunity from local people. 1 2 3 4 
Question B. 
In your view what are the major factors adversely affecting foreign banks' investment 
decision and operations? 
(Please circle the number of each factor, 1 represents no adverse impact, 2 represents 
some adverse impact, 3 represents considerable adverse impact and 4 represents very 
considerable adverse impact.) 
very considerable 
no adverse impact adverse impact 
18. Political instability. 1 2 3 4 
19. Frequent changes in economic policies. 1 2 3 4 
20. Endless business negotiations. 1 2 3 4 
21. Burdensome bureaucracy. 1 2 3 4 
22. Language barrier. 1 2 3 4 
23. Stress of "guanxi" (relationship) in China. 1 2 3 4 
24. Difficulty in communication. 1 2 3 4 
25. Differences in social customs. 1 2 3 4 
26. Differences in negotiation styles. 1 2 3 4 
27. Ideological differences. 1 2 3 4 
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28. Non-convertibility of the RMB. 1 2 3 4 
29. Lack of necessary transportation facilities. 1 2 3 4 
30. Lack of communication facilities. 1 2 3 4 
31. Credit standing of the state-owned enterprises. 1 2 3 4 
32. Corruption. 1 2 3 4 
33. Centrally planned economy. 1 2 3 4 
34. Triangular debts of the state-owned enterprises. 1 2 3 4 
35. The enforceability of laws and regulations. 1 2 3 4 
36. Competition from other foreign banks. 1 2 3 4 
37. In general, lending to China is risky. 1 2 3 4 
Question C. 
Please provide the following general background information about your bank: 
(Please lick one unless otherwise specify.) 
38. The name of your bank 
39. The ownership structure of your bank: 
a. PRC owned bank 
b. local bank owned by local investors 
c. local bank with local and foreign ownership 
d. foreign bank (North American capital) 
e. foreign bank (European capital) 
f. foreign bank (Australian & New Zealand capital) 
g. foreign bank (Asian capital) 
— h. others 
please specify ； 
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40. What are the types of investment ol. your bank in China: (you may select more than 
one) 
a. self-owned branches 
b. joint venture banks 
c. none 
41. Your ranking in the bank: 
a. Officer to Manager 
b. Senior Manager to Deputy General Manager 
c. General Manager/Chief Executive Officer 
d. Others 
please specify 1 
42. Are you Head of China Department: Yes No 
43. Number of years of working experience in China business: 
44. Your place of work: 
a. Hong Kong 
b. China 
Thank you for your time and effort. 
~~ THE END — 
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APPENDIX 111 
List of Foreign Banks with Offices in China 
ABN-AMRO 
A L A H U BANK OF KUWAIT 
American Express Bank 
ANZ Banking Group 
Arab Bank PLC 
Asashi Bank 
Banca di Roma 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Banco Central Hispanoamerican 
Banco Ambrosiano Veneto 
Banco do Brazil 
Banco Exterior de Espana 




Bank of America 
Bank of East Asia 
Bank of Montreal 
Bank of New York 
Bank of Nova Scotia 
Bank of Tokyo 
Bank of Yokohama 
Bankers Trust 
Banque Indosuez 






Cho Hung Bank 
Chiyu Banking Corp. 
Chuo Trust & Banking 




Commercial Bank of Korea 






CS First Boston 
Dah Sing Bank 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank 




Dao Heng Bank 
Export-Import Bank of Japan 
Export-Import Bank of Korea 
First Interstate Bank of California 
First National Bank of Chicago 





Hang Seng Bank 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
Hong Kong Bank 
Hua Chiao Commercial Bank 
Industrial Bank of Japan 
1st Bancario San Paolo di Torino 
Internationale Nedeiianden Bank 
Keppel Bank 
Korea Exchange Bank 
Kyowa Bank 
Kredietbank 
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 




Mitsubishi Trust & Banking 
Mitsui Trust & Banking 
c. 
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Nanyang Commercial Bank 
National Australia Bank 
National Bank of Pakistan 
NedBank -
Nippon Credit Bank 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corp. 
Overseas Union Bank 
Po Sang Bank 
Caripio Bank 
Republic Bank of New York 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Sakura Bank 
Sanwa Bank 
Shinhan Bank, Seoul 
Skandinavska Enskilda Banken 
Societe Generale 
South Korea Bank 
Standard Chartered Bank 
Sumitomo Bank 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking 
Svenska Handelsbanken 
Swiss Bank Corp. 
Takugin International 
Tat Lee Bank 
Tokai Bank 
Toyo Trust & Banking 
Unibank 
Union Bank of Finland 
Union Bank of Switzerland 
United Overseas Bank 
Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Westpac Banking Corp. 
Yamaguchi Bank 
Yasuda Trust & Banking 
Source: Matthew Montagu-Pollock, "High Risk, Good (Long-Term) Returns", 
Asiamoney. September 1994, p.34-41. 
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